I unravel the basic long run dynamics of the broker call money market, which is the pile of cash that funds margin loans to retail clients (read: continuous time Kelly gamblers). Call money is assumed to supply itself perfectly inelastically, and to continuously reinvest all principal and interest. I show that the relative size of the money market (that is, relative to the Kelly bankroll) is a martingale that nonetheless converges in probability to zero. The margin loan interest rate is a submartingale that converges in mean square to the choke price r ∞ := ν − σ 2 /2, where ν is the asymptotic compound growth rate of the stock market and σ is its annual volatility. In this environment, the gambler no longer beats the market asymptotically a.s. by an exponential factor (as he would under perfectly elastic supply). Rather, he beats the market asymptotically with very high probability (think 98%) by a factor (say 1.87, or 87% more final wealth) whose mean cannot exceed what the leverage ratio was at the start of the model (say, 2 : 1). Although the ratio of the gambler's wealth to that of an equivalent buy-and-hold investor is a submartingale (always expected to increase), his realized compound growth rate converges in mean square to ν. This happens because the equilibrium leverage ratio converges to 1 : 1 in lockstep with the gradual rise of margin loan interest rates.
"There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it.
For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest.
And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent." -Aristotle, Politics "According to Laplace, the state of the world at a given instant is defined by an infinite number of parameters, subject to an infinite number of differential equations. If some universal mind could write down all these equations and integrate them, it could then predict with complete exactness, according to Laplace, the entire evolution of
Introduction
This paper studies a system of stochastic differential equations that purports to express the iron laws of dynamical equilibrium behavior in the broker call money market, a market that exists for the sake of funding stock brokers' margin loans to retail clients.
We assume that the (aggregate) demand side of the market is comprised of continuous time Kelly (1956) gamblers. Kelly's seminal (1956) article takes up the problem of repeated bets on independent horse races for which the gambler has a better-quality estimate of the win probabilities than does the bookie, whose beliefs are implicit in the posted odds. The common-sense insight is that the (stationary) nature of the problem dictates that the gambler should always bet a fixed fraction of his wealth on this (favorable) opportunity; for obvious reasons, the Kelly fraction is chosen so as to optimize the asymptotic continuously-compounded per-bet capital growth rate.
Leo Breiman (1961) demonstrated the competitively superior properties of the Kelly Criterion: namely, that it asymptotically almost surely beats any "essentially different" stratgy by an exponential factor; and it has the shortest mean waiting time for hitting a distant wealth goal.
In our problem, each horse race has been replaced by a differential tick dt of the market clock, whereby the stock market index S t undergoes a fluctuation dS t that determines the gambler's profit-and-loss. Unlike betting on a horse race (where you should not bet 100% of your wealth because you will eventually lose it all), it is highly advisable, given a low enough margin loan interest rate, to bet more than 100% of your wealth on every little movement of the stock market. To fix ideas, let us assume that the S&P 500 index multiplies itself at an expected (logarithmic) rate of ν := 9% a year, with σ := 15% annual (log-) volatility. If we were to imagine, in passing, that σ tends to zero, then it becomes clear by continuity considerations that we should be falling all over ourselves in order to borrow money at a margin rate of, say, 5%.
In the context of leveraged investment, Kelly's fixed fraction betting scheme implies an ostensibly counter-intuitive trading mechanic. To illustrate, let us assume that we have $100, and that we resolve to act so as to maintain a constant 2× level of exposure to the S&P 500 index. This means that we must try to always maintain a margin loan (debit) balance equal to the level of our account equity; the loan-to-value ratio must always be 50%. Now, assume that we wake up tomorrow and the stock market has gapped up 10%; our new account equity is $120
Liabilities . Whatever were our good reasons to lever the initial $100 twice over, it seems natural that they should continue to apply to our newer, wealthier self. Note well that the market has effectively chosen for us the new leverage ratio of 1.83 : 1, with a corresponding loan-to-value ratio of 45.5%. Thus, our fixed-fraction betting scheme dictates that we must borrow and invest an additional $20 (which is equal to the profits just earned).
Although this behavior gives off the optics of a trend-following, performance-chasing, or market-timing scheme, the simple fact is that we are just going back to the well so as to carry on exploiting the opportunity to borrow at a low price. To be clear, the "trend" in question is the exponential growth of corporate earnings and dividends that is manifest in the high drift rate of the log-price of the market index.
The flip side of the coin is that the gambler must unwind this very process when the market goes down; for, suppose that on the next day, the index price gets divided by a factor of 1.1 (for a loss of 9.1%), e.g. it returns full circle back to its original level. Our portfolio assets have thereby dwindled in value to $240 ÷ 1.1 = $218.18 (against liabilities of $120), for a net equity of $98.18. Thus, the "sideways" motion of the asset price has caused us to underperform a buy-and-hold investor; we have been "whipsawed" by the cold arithmetic of buying high and selling low. On that score, our leverage ratio has just balooned to 2.22×, which makes for a loan-to-value ratio of 55%. In order to remedy this (overlevered) situation, our scheme dictates that we must liquidate $21.82 of assets, e.g. the amount of money that we just lost in the fire.
This simple example makes it abundantly clear just what is the fundamental trade-off that is faced by the continuous time Kelly gambler. On the one hand, we expect to earn the spread between the margin loan interest rate and the compound growth rate of the market index; on the other, we must deduct the ongoing costs of the whipsaw effect, which become more pronounced with higher levels of volatility in the underlying. The sweet spot that perfectly balances these two considerations (check with David Luenberger 1998) amounts to the magic leverage ratio b
where r L is the margin loan interest rate.
If we assume that margin loans are supplied perfectly elastically (e.g. a horizontal supply curve), then the continuous time Kelly gambler has access to a permanent source of funding that allows him to beat the market asymptotically almost surely by an exponential factor (cf. with Garivaltis 2019b). This "bucket shop" 1 envrionment, with its unlimited supply of Saps willing to provide cash to their betters for a song, has obvious practical defects from a meta-perspective. Namely, on a long enough time horizon, the Kelly gamblers must inevitably own every single dollar of stock market capitalization.
Thus, in order to get a realistic equilibrium outcome, we have decided in this paper to stand the supply curve on its head. The Saps, who are in possession of a giant pool of call money, are now assumed to supply it perfectly inelastically at the going rate (e.g. as determined by a vertical supply curve). Hapless though they are, A. Garivaltis they nonetheless manage to multiply their capital at an exponential rate; this paper assumes that all principal and interest payments are continuously reinvested in the money market.
How is this natural and straightforward market structure going to shake itself out in the long run, given all the reverberatory effects of so many random vibrations in the asset price? These pages contain the answer.
The Model
We assume that the stock market index or ETF has N shares outstanding, and its price per share S t evolves according to the geometric Brownian motion
where S 0 is the (given) initial price at time 0. Here, µ denotes the annual drift rate, σ is the annual volatility, and W t is a standard Brownian motion. The log-price evolves
where ν := µ − σ 2 /2 is the almost-sure asymptotic continuously-compounded capital growth rate
We assume that, at every instant t, there is a quantity q t of loan money ("broker call money") that is supplied inelastically to the retail brokerage market. The money market charges a continuously-compounded interest rate of r L (t) per year for the A. Garivaltis duration of the differential time step [t, t + dt], where r L (t) will be determined below in equilibrium. Naturally, we assume that the money market continuously reinvests all proceeds (both principal and interest), and so the size of the money market evolves according to
where q 0 is exogenously given. Thus, we have the relation
The demand side of the broker call money market is supposed to be constituted by a (representative) continuous time Kelly (1956) gambler, that "bets" the fraction b t ∈ [1, ∞) of his wealth on the stock market for the differential time step [t, t + dt].
In so doing, since b t ≥ 1, he has borrowed the quantity q t := (b t − 1) × V t from the money market; the loan must be repaid (both principal and interest) "on call" at time t + dt. Starting from a given initial value of V 0 , the gambler's fortune V t evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
Applying Itô's Lemma (cf. with Thomas Mikosch 1998) to the transformed process V t → log V t , we see that the gambler's log-fortune evolves according to
The gambler's expected continuously-compounded growth rate over [t, t + dt] is equal to (cf. with David Luenberger 1998)
The Kelly bet (cf. with Edward O. Thorp 2 2006 Thorp 2 , 2017 for the next tick of the market clock (dt) is, by definition, the fraction of wealth that maximizes the growth rate:
Note well that the maximized (instantaneous expected continuously-compounded) growth rate is a stochastic process 3 (Γ t ) t≥0 that fluctuates according to the prevailing margin loan interest rate r L (t); substituting the Kelly bet (11) into the objective function (10), we get the expressions
A. Garivaltis
We will require the fact that the process (Γ t ) t≥0 is bounded:
The minorant µ − σ 2 /2 ≡ Γ(1, r L (t)) is the growth rate of an unlevered investor (b := 1) who just buys the market index, and holds. The majorant µ 2 ÷ (2σ 2 ) is the Kelly growth rate that obtains when the margin loan interest rate is zero. To put it differently, we have
The instantaneous demand curve for margin loans is
The corresponding instantaneous inverse demand curve is
and the (price) elasticity of instantaneous demand for margin loans is
Since all q t dollars of call money are supplied inelastically by the money market, we A. Garivaltis have the vertical supply curve
Intersecting supply and demand, we get the equilibrium interest rate
where
is the choke price of margin debt, and
denotes the positive part of the number x. On account of the equilibrium price (19),
we get the formula
Thus, our dynamical model amounts to the following three assumptions:
(I.) All q t dollars of call money are supplied inelastically.
(II.) The broker call money market continuously reinvests all its interest dq t and principal q t .
(III.) All margin loans are issued to continuous time Kelly gamblers; the loans pass through costlessly from the money market, with no additional markup from stock brokers.
To help visualize this environment, Figure 1 plots the supply and demand curves for both t := 0 and t := 10 years later, along with the corresponding sample path (q t , r L (t)) 0≤t≤10 in the price-quantity plane. The simulation (50,000 steps, ∆t := the following upper bound:
Thus, the margin loan interest rate is bounded from below by the expression:
Proof. First, we note the fact that q t ≤ q 0 × e (µ−σ 2 )t , e.g. the call money market can never compound its money any faster than the choke price µ − σ 2 . That is, looking at the interest rate expression (19), we have the upper bound r L (t) ≤ µ−σ 2 ; juxtaposing this inequality with the integral (7) yields q t ≤ q 0 × exp{(µ − σ 2 )t}, as promised. On A. Garivaltis the other hand, the gambler's fortune is bounded below by the quantity
For, looking at the differential equation (9), and bearing in mind that
we have
Combining the majorant q t ≤ q 0 × e (µ−σ 2 )t with the minorant (23) for V t , we get the stated result (21).
In plain language, Lemma 1 says that the locally expected growth rate of the gambler's fortune always exceeds the expected growth rate of the market index; on the other hand, the compound growth rate of the broker call money market (at most µ − σ 2 ) is expected to be lower than that of the market index. To be sure, the actual dynamics of the relative market size (q t /V t ) t≥0 is ultimately determined by the realized path (W t ) t≥0 of the Brownian motion that drives all uncertainty in the economy. But based on the expected difference in the exponential growth rates of V t and q t , it is clear that after the elapse of many years (read: decades or centuries), the chances are high that the aggregate quantity of call money will be small in relation to the total bankrolls of continuous time Kelly gamblers.
Theorem 1. The size of the broker call money market relative to Kelly gamblers' total equity converges in probability 4 to zero:
Thus, the leverage ratio of Kelly gamblers converges in probability to 1 (b ∞ := plim t→∞ b t = 1) and the margin loan interest rate converges in probability 5 to the choke price:
The growth rate process Γ t converges in probability to the buy-and-hold growth rate:
Proof. Since the Kelly bet
is a continuous function of the ratio q t /V t , and the interest rate r L (t) = µ−σ 2 b t is in turn a continuous function of b t , it suffices to show that q t /V t converges in probability to 0, since probability limits are preserved by continuous transformations. There follows plim t→∞
Thus, let be any positive real number. Applying Lemma 1, we get the relations
That is, note that the process X t := −t
zero in mean square: we have
and, combining the Itô isometry (cf. Tomas Bjőrk 1998) with the bound 1 ≤ b s ≤ 5 Since the processes b t and r L (t) are bounded (1 ≤ b t ≤ µ/σ 2 and 0 ≤ r L (t) ≤ µ − σ 2 ), they do indeed converge in mean square to 1 and µ − σ 2 , respectively. The ratio q t /V t has no such bounds; it may take any value in (0, +∞).
A. Garivaltis µ/σ 2 , we get
so that lim t→∞ Var[X t ] = 0. Since the process (X t ) t≥0 converges to zero in mean square, it certainly converges to zero in probability; in particular, this means that
By the squeeze theorem, then, we have obtained the desired result: for all > 0,
Corollary 1. The margin loan interest rate r L (t) converges in mean square to the choke price r ∞ := µ−σ 2 = ν −σ 2 /2 and the Kelly bet b t converges in mean square to 1.
The instantaneous Kelly growth rate Γ t converges in mean square to the buy-and-hold growth rate ν = µ − σ 2 /2.
Proof. It suffices to show that b t converges in mean square to 1; then, on account of
To this end, let be any positive number, and let R t := q t /V t denote the relative size of the call money market. We have
Using the fact that lim t→∞ Prob{R t ≥ } = 0, we see that the following relation must obtain for every > 0:
Since the lim sup t→∞ of the mean-squared error is smaller than every positive number, we get the inequalities
Finally, turning our attention to the instantaneous Kelly growth rate Γ t = r L (t) + − − → µ − σ 2 , we will have Γ t m.s.
Accordingly, we bound the mean-squared error and standard deviations {Std(b t ), Std(r L (t))} 0≤t≤100 that were generated from 50, 000
simulations of 50, 000 steps each (∆t := 17.5 hours). In the same vein, Figure 3 gives a 30-year sample path of the instantaneous growth rate process (Γ t ) for the same parameters, along with Monte Carlo estimates of the functions t → E[Γ t ] and t → Std(Γ t ) that were computed from 40, 000 simulations (∆t := 6.6 hours).
Theorem 2. The relative size q t /V t of the money market is a martingale (in spite of the fact that it converges in probability to zero); the Kelly bet b t is a supermartingale (e.g. it is always expected to decrease) and the margin loan interest rate r L (t) is a submartingale (e.g. it is always expected to increase). 
hours) of the functions t → E[Γ t ] and t → Std(Γ t ).
Proof. We apply the quotient rule of the Itô calculus (cf. with Ovidiu Calin 2015) to the ratio q t /V t :
According to the Itô multiplication 
A. Garivaltis Thus, the stochastic process (q t /V t ) t≥0 is a martingale, since it has zero drift and admits the (Itô) integral representation
On account of the fact that b t = min(1 + q t /V t , µ/σ 2 ) is a concave function of the martingale q t /V t , we conclude that (b t ) t≥0 is a supermartingale, e.g. it is always expected to decrease (cf. with Lawrence Evans 2010). Likewise, the interest rate
is a submartingale, since it is a convex function of a martingale.
Thus, although the chances are high that the ratio R t := q t /V t is very low in the long run, it nevertheless has a constant mean E[R t ] ≡ q 0 /V 0 ; this happens on account of a few sample paths for which the stock market dramatically underperforms the broker call money market. The (unconditionally) expected interest rate E[r L (t)] is an increasing function of time that converges to µ − σ 2 ; conditional on the current state of things at time t, the expected margin rate E[r L (t + ∆t)|r L (t)] at any time in the future is greater than or equal to the current observation r L (t). However, the expected increases in the interest rate (and attendant decreases in the aggregate leverage ratio) are disturbed by so many random vibrations of the stock market. The margin loan interest rate responds pro-cyclically to random noise in the financial markets; the leverage ratios of continuous time Kelly gamblers respond counter-cyclically. But the underlying signal (that is, the exponential growth of asset prices) suffices to generate a permanent uptrend in margin loan interest rates.
Corollary 2. The probability of the margin loan interest rate ever hitting zero (be-
Proof. The condition that the margin loan interest rate r L (t) hits zero at least once over a given horizon [0, T ] is equivalent to the condition that the ratio q t /V t breaches µ/σ 2 − 1 at least once. Since (q t /V t ) t≥0 is a positive martingale, Doob's martingale inequality obtains (cf. Lawrence Evans 2010); in our context, this inequality amounts to Prob max
where we have used the fact that E[q T /V T ] ≡ q 0 /V 0 . Taking the limit of the inequality (42) as T → ∞, we obtain the desired result, that Prob sup
Thus, if the current margin loan interest rate amounts to 70% of the choke price, then the chance of it ever hitting zero is at most 30%. If the current rate is 20% of the asymptotic interest rate, then the chance of it ever reaching zero is at most 80%, etc. Table 1 illustrates the majorant for different stock market volatilities and compoundannual (logarithmic) growth rates, assuming that the money market begins on par with the gambler's fortune (q 0 /V 0 := 1). Naturally, the bound becomes tighter as the stock market parameters become more favorable (higher ν, lower σ); it also tightens with the relative scarcity of loanable funds (lower q 0 /V 0 ). is 4.25%. Assuming the stylized parameters (ν, σ) := (0.09, 0.15) for the S&P 500 index, we get a choke price of 7.9%. Thus, we reckon that the chance of the margin loan interest rate ever hitting zero is at most 4.25 ÷ 7.9 = 54%.
Proposition 1.
We have the following bounds on the (unconditional) standard deviation of the relative market size q t /V t :
In particular, lim t→∞ Std(q t /V t ) = +∞.
Proof. For notational convenience, we let F (t) := E[(q t /V t ) 2 ] denote the second moment of the relative size process. Recalling the (Itô) integral representation
the Itô isometry implies that
which, upon differentiating, gives us
Now, bearing in mind that 1 ≤ b 2 t ≤ µ 2 /σ 4 , we have the inequalities
or equivalently,
Integrating the inequalities (49) and simplifying, we obtain the theoretical bounds
Remembering that
, taking the square root of (50) yields the stated result.
Thus, although the martingale (q t /V t ) t≥0 converges in probability to zero, its standard deviation grows to infinity at a geometric rate. The (deterministic) function t → Std(q t /V t ) was estimated from 100, 000 experiments of 100, 000 steps each; the corresponding step size was ∆t := 10.5 minutes.
Note that the population standard deviation E[(q t /V t ) 2 ] − (q 0 /V 0 ) 2 is required to be increasing on account of the fact that the process (q t /V t ) 2 is a submartingale (e.g. it is a convex function of q t /V t ). For the sake of visualization, Figure 5 plots a 100-year sample path of q t /V t for the same deep parameters (q 0 , V 0 , ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15); the experiment consisted of 100, 000 steps, for a step size of 8.8 hours. Table 1 : Upper bounds on the probability of the margin loan interest rate ever hitting zero over t ∈ [0, +∞), for different stock market volatilities and growth rates, assuming that the money market starts on par with the gambler's fortune (q 0 /V 0 := 1).
*Percentage of all simulations for which the margin loan interest rate hit the zero bound (standard errors in parentheses). 25, 000 simulations per estimate, spanning 200 years each, 25, 000 steps per simulation, ∆t := 2.92 days. Estimates computed from the simulation of 100, 000 sample paths of 100, 000 steps each (∆t := 10.5 minutes).
Proof. On account of the expresstion
it follows that
is the average value of the (deterministic
Since r L (t) converges in mean square to r ∞ , we have the relation lim t→∞ E[r L (t)] = r ∞ ; thus, the average value of the function t → E[r L (t)] must also converge to r ∞ . It remains to show that Figure 5 : 100-year sample path of q t /V t , generated by the parameters q 0 := 1, V 0 := 1, ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15, and µ := ν + σ 2 /2 = 0.1012. 100,000 steps, step size = 8.8 hours. Crossing the blue (dashed) barrier results in a margin loan interest rate of zero.
To this end, we invoke the formula (cf. with Hoel, Port, and Stone 1972)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (e.g. check with T.T. Soong 1973) says that
Hence, since the right-hand-side of (55) is multiplicatively separable in the variables s and t, the double integral (54) is majorized by the square of the unidimensional
Std(r L (t))dt; this gives us the variance bound
The right-hand-side of (56) converges to zero as T → ∞ because it is the average value of the (deterministic) function t → Std(r L (t)), which itself converges to zero on account of the fact that r L (t) converges in mean square to r ∞ . This proves that the realized money market growth rate log(q T /q 0 )/T converges in mean square to the choke price r ∞ = µ − σ 2 .
Turning our attention to the realized compound-growth rate of the Kelly bankroll over 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we integrate the left-hand-side of (24) and obtain the expression
Bearing in mind that E[y T ] ≡ 0, we get
which is the average value of the deterministic function t → E[Γ t ] over the interval to what we just did with the interest rate r L (t), we write
The last bracketed expression in (59) converges to 0 as T → ∞ because it is the average value of the function t → Std(Γ t ) over the interval [0, T ], a function whose value itself converges to 0 as t → ∞.
To illustrate the Theorem, Figure 6 plots the realized growth rate series Theorem 4 (Change of Numéraire). The ratio V t /S t of the gambler's fortune to the price of one unit of the market index (e.g. the value of the bankroll as measured in shares of the ETF) is a submartingale (always expected to increase). The total size q t /S t of the money market, as expressed in units of this numéraire, is a supermartingale that converges in probability to zero. The aggregate wealth in the model (q t +V t )/S t (money market plus gambler's equity) is a supermartingale when expressed has the property that
The relative growth factor (V t /V 0 ) ÷ (S t /S 0 ) amounts to the ratio of the Kelly gambler's bankroll to the wealth of a buy-and-hold investor (b ≡ 1) who started with the same initial capital. Note that, although the cumulative outperformance realized by the Kelly gambler over [0, t] is always expected to increase, it fails to grow to infinity at an exponential rate (as it would under perfectly elastic supply of margin loans). Rather, the asymptotic relative growth factor is a finite, random quantity that may even turn out to be less than 1 (albeit with low probability). At the start of the model, the Kelly gambler cannot expect to ever achieve more than 1+q 0 /V 0 times the wealth of a buy-and-hold investor who started with the same amount of money.
Say, if the initial interest rate is positive and the initial leverage ratio is b 0 := 2 (the maximum allowed by U.S. Regulation-T), then we cannot expect to achieve more than double the final wealth of an equivalent buy-and-hold investor.
Proof. Applying the Itô quotient rule to the process (V t /S t ) t≥0 , one calculates that
Thus, (V t /S t ) t≥0 is a submartingale because of its positive drift, which obtains on account of the fact that b t > 1 and r L < µ − σ 2 . A similar calculation shows that
whence (q t /S t ) t≥0 is a supermartingale because of its negative drift rate. Combining equations (63) and (64), and simplifying, we obtain
Recalling that b t = min(1 + q t /V t , µ/σ 2 ) ≤ 1 + q t /V t , we see that (q t + V t )/S t is a supermartingale, since its drift is ≤ 0. With these facts in hand, we have the
where we have used the fact that E[(q t + V t )/S t ] is a decreasing function of time.
Multiplying (66) through by S 0 /V 0 , we get the promised result:
Finally, for the sake of demonstrating that plim t→∞ q t /S t = 0, we start with the upper
If is any positive number, then
where N (•) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function. Thus, we have
which is the desired result. Figure 7 supplements Theorem 4 by plotting a 100-year (100, 000-step) sample path of the time series V t /S t , q t /S t , (q t + V t )/S t , and r L (t) for the parameters (q 0 , V 0 , ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.08, 0.2). For this particular simulation (∆t := 8.8 hours), we made the stock market index less favorable than it was in our previous experiments (lower ν, higher σ) so as to highlight the model's behavior when the margin loan interest rate hits zero very frequently on its way up to r ∞ . To help visualize the population statistics under this change of numéraire, Figure 8 provides a 300-year Figure 7 : 100-year sample path of the stochastic processes V t /S t , (q t + V t )/S t , q t /S t , and r L (t) for the parameters (q 0 , V 0 , ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.08, 0.2). 100, 000 steps, ∆t := 8.8 hours.
plot of the time functions
, and E[(q t + V t )/S t ] for these same parameters. 
Summary and Conclusions
This paper established the core dynamical behavior of the broker call money market, which supplies cash to stock brokers for the sake of funding margin loans to retail clients. We assumed (naturally) that the demand side of the market is comprised of continuous time Kelly gamblers, who size their bets over each tick dt of the clock so as to maximize their expected continuously-compounded capital growth rate over [t, t+dt] . Ordinarily, under perfectly elastic supply of margin loans (cf. with Garivaltis 2019a), the Kelly gambler is able to beat the market asymptotically almost surely, and by an exponential factor to boot.
To model the powerful long run feedback effects that these sophisticated investors must have on the equilibrium price of margin debt, we assumed that the production side of market amounts to a giant pool of cash that supplies itself inelastically and continuously reinvests all principal and interest. Thus, although the total size of the money market (q t ) grows to infinity at a geometric rate, this rate of supply expansion is lower than the asymptotic growth rate ν of the market index (S t ) and the expected compound growth rate of the Kelly bankroll (V t ). Proceeding with this intuition, we found that the relative market size (q t /V t ) t≥0 is a martingale (whose variance tends to infinity) that nonetheless converges to zero in probability 6 ; (q t /S t ) t≥0 is a supermartingale that converges to zero in probability. Consequently, the margin loan interest rate is a submartingale (always expected to increase) that converges in mean square to the choke price r ∞ = ν − σ 2 /2, where σ is the annual log-volatility of the stock market. If the relative size of the money market becomes unexpectedly large (e.g. due to bad stock market performance), then the margin loan interest rate may happen to hit zero on its way up to r ∞ ; we found a nice rule of thumb for bounding the chances of this ever happening (from here to eternity): the probability is at most 1 − (Current Interest Rate ÷ Choke Price). Based on numerical solutions of the differential equations, we observed that this majorant is typically within 3% of the actual value.
In the same vein, we concluded that the Kelly leverage ratio (b t ) t≥0 is a supermartingale that converges in mean square to 1 : 1; thus, the very success of the
